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Research Question
What can topic modeling analysis of Supreme Court opinions over time
reflect about the Supreme Court’s procedural tendencies and changing
views on a specific area of Constitutional law?

Background on Legal Content Analysis
Legal scholars have been known to, in their analysis of the law,
borrow from academic methodologies belonging to subjects
ranging from economics to moral philosophy. A relatively new
method of empirical legal analysis has been employed using
machine learning and content analysis. The bulk of the studies
done using this method tend to analyze large textual datasets,
and, in doing so, attempt to use word clustering in legal text
corpuses to draw conclusions about writing style or the larger
ideological or judicial-reasoning phenomena indicated by language
use. Oftentimes, these studies draw comparisons between data
from different time periods in order to track temporal changes in
these subjects. Content analysis is especially applicable to law, as
stated in Law, Fact, and the Threat of Reversal From Above:
“participants in the legal process who want to convey a particular
message must use a relatively limited and predictable set of
terms.” This means that changes in the language used in legal
documents is especially noteworthy, as judicial thought leaders
can often be identified by their use of unique, new terminology in
their opinions.

Methodology
In my research project, I thought it would be interesting to try
approaching a smaller dataset than those found in the research I read on
legal content analysis. Specifically, I hone in on Supreme Court opinions
about reproductive rights relating to abortion that deal substantively
with the right to privacy. Reproductive rights are a hot button issue in
today’s political climate, especially in light of recent changes to the
ideological makeup of the Court, which makes this area of focus
especially relevant for analysis. I used the guiding components laid out
in Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions to model this project:
(1) selecting cases; (2) coding cases; and (3) analyzing the case coding. I
compare topic models of opinions on abortion-related reproductive
rights grouped by decade, starting with the landmark 1973 Roe v. Wade
opinion. The text of the opinions I use comes from Court Listener, and
the topic modeling method I use is MALLET, through a GUI-equipped
version called Topic Modeling Tool. The settings for the topic modeling
were: 300 iterations, 4 topic threads, and 7 printed topic words.

Cases Analyzed
Roe v. Wade (1973)
Hodgson v. Minnesota (1990)
Doe v. Bolton (1973)
Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth (1976) Health (1990)
Maher v. Roe (1979)
Rust v. Sullivan (1991)
Colautti v. Franklin (1979)
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Bellotti v. Baird (1979)
Pa. v. Casey (1992)
Harris v. McRae (1980)
Lambert v. Wicklund (1997)
Williams v. Zbaraz (1980)
Mazurek v. Armstrong (1997)
H.L. v. Matheson (1981)
Stenberg v. Carhart (2000)
City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of
Reproductive Health (1983)
Northern New England (2006)
Planned Parenthood Association of
Gonzales v. Carhart (2007)
Kansas City, Mo. v. Ashcroft (1983)
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt
Simopoulos v. Virginia (1983)
(2016)
Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (1986)
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services
(1989)

History of Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court’s judicial opinions on abortion begin in 1973 with the
landmark decision Roe v. Wade. In this decision, the Court found that
individuals have a right to procure an abortion under the guarantee of a
right to privacy found in the Fourteenth Amendment and various other
Amendments in the Bill of Rights. The Court balanced this interest
against the United States’ interest in protecting the potential life of the
fetus. In navigating this balance, the Court established a three-tier
framework based in the three trimesters of pregnancy for determining
when the fundamental right to abortion is being violated. The right is
greater towards the beginning of the pregnancy, but as fetal
development progresses the government gains a legitimate interest in its
well-being and has more leeway for restricting the right to abortion. For
about fifteen years afterwards, the Court focused centrally on working
out the specifics and logistics of the Roe decision. In 1989, however, in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, the Court began to slightly
alter the jurisprudence surrounding abortion by ruling that the
government had no requirement to help fund access to abortion except
in cases which would threaten the life of the mother. In 1992, the Court
continued this line of regulation when it ruled in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey that some regulations by the
government on access to abortions, like mandatory waiting periods and
parental consent for minors, were legitimate. In the 2007 Gonzales v.
Carhart decision, the Court banned a method of abortion that it found to
be disrespectful to the sanctity of life, despite the scientific evidence that
it did not endanger the mother’s health. This slow chipping away at the
Roe v. Wade decision through minor regulations and deviations from its
initial framework defines the modern period of abortion jurisprudence,
eventually resulting in a departure from the initial three-trimester
framework established in Roe for a more flexible sliding scale of fetal
viability, and the replacement of the strict scrutiny standard for the
government’s regulation of the right to abortion with the less rigid undue
burden standard.

Results
Below, are the results of my topic modeling analysis of the Supreme
Court opinions, separated by year. On the left, are screenshots of the
raw results from Topic Modeling Tool placed chronologically. On the
right, I’ve cleaned up the results and placed the top three topic modeling
categories on a timeline. The percentages indicate the prevalence of the
topic in the documents, and the words are repeated representatives of
the topic.

Analysis & Conclusion
I categorized the three largest topics as follows, in order from largest to smallest:
1) general judicial subject; 2) specific area of law; 3) basis of judicial
decision. Below, are the conclusions I drew about the shift in the makeup of
these topics and what they represent in relation to how the Court functions and
how its rulings about abortion have changed over time.
1) General Judicial Subject
In both the seventies and eighties groups of opinions, this topic is very
general, with references to “physician,” “abortion,” and “pregnancy.” It indicates
that the Court is ruling on abortion, and also that it is the beginning of this area
of jurisprudence for the Supreme Court. In the nineties group of opinions,
however, we see the introduction of some more specific terms, like “minor” and
“consent,” showing that the Court has now moved to more specific regulations of
the subjects of abortion law. The final group of opinions from the twenty-first
century has words that reference abortion more generally, but also includes the
word “intact.” This is likely in reference to the subject of Gonzales v. Carhart,
which determined the legal status of the intact dilation and extraction procedure
for abortion. This is interesting, as it shows the general directions the Court has
been taking in regards to abortion law in each decade, first approaching it most
generally, then approaching the more specific extraneous subjects to the law,
and finally the methods by which abortion is performed. This final direction,
however, raises a question for me about whether medical procedures should be
regulated so specifically by the Court, considering they are legal scholars and
not medical professionals.
2) Specific Area of Law
In the seventies group of opinions, this topic is still very general, making
references to “woman,” “appellants,” and “abortion,” which makes sense
considering it is the beginning of this area of jurisprudence, so it would not yet
have gained specificity. In the eighties group, we see the word “hyde,” which is
in reference to the proposed Hyde Amendment that would have outlawed
abortion. We see the Court, here, responding to legislative reactions to the Roe
v. Wade decision. The nineties group of opinions makes references to “parent”
and “notification,” which shows a continuation of the Court’s specific responses
to legislation, in this case laws being passed to regulate minors’ access to
abortion, which was a repeated subject in the opinions of that era. The topic for
the twenty-first century group of opinions uses words like “procedure” and
“fetus,” which makes sense considering the Court’s move into regulating the
medical procedures surrounding abortion. Interestingly, this topic makes no
mention of “woman,” like the seventies topic does, but instead references
“fetus.” This effectively represents the shift in the balancing of rights in favor of
the potential life of a fetus, and the relaxing of the strict scrutiny previously
required to limit a woman’s right to abortion.
3) Basis of Judicial Decision
In this topic from the seventies group of opinions, the terms used are once
again very general, making references to “appeal” and “medical.” These terms
show how the Court relies on facts and non-binding legal documents in early
cases such as these, as opposed to non-existent precedent. In the eighties
topic, we see the introduction of words like “decision” and “cases,” which are
likely references to past decisions by the Court on abortion. This makes sense
in that time period, as the abortion rulings of the eighties were largely about
specifying the logistics of applying Roe v. Wade. This reference to precedent
continues in the nineties topic, as evidenced by the words “Roe” and “Bellotti,”
which are both the names of parties in past Supreme Court abortion
cases. Interestingly, however, the twenty-first century topic for this category
diverges from the legalistic nature of the past two decades. The only judicial
word in the topic is “trial,” which would likely not be a word used to reference
precedent. This indicates a return to the facts of the case in ruling about
abortion, and reflects the recent move away from the framework established in
Roe v. Wade.
The above analyses show that topic modeling can be a useful tool to empirically
exemplify the shifts in Supreme Court rulings about abortion law that have been
already established by legal scholars. We can see a divergence from the initial
framework of Roe v. Wade and the placement of greater weight in the potential
life of the fetus as a legitimate justification for government regulation of
abortion. Also, since legal language is so closely tied to legal concepts, this
analysis can be a useful way to gain new perspectives on these shifts in
jurisprudence. It also is an effective means by which to raise important and
interesting questions about what the Court relies on in its rulings, as represented
by the rhetoric and terminology employed, like its recent move towards medical
logistics as an area of focus.
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